



NATION, COMMUNITY, MINORITY, IDENTITY – THE 
ROLE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
THE PROTECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 






The papers published in this volume by distinguished 
Hungarian, Serbian and Serbian-Hungarian 
colleagues delve into questions motivated by the four 
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words in the title: nation, community, minority and 
identity.  
We could very well say that in the “age of 
constitutional identity” any identitarian inquiry is 
well brought to the foreground of academic discourse 
and political activism.  
In the opening essay of his book, János Martonyi 
writes about the “age of identities” and asks the 
following questions in the context of global 
processes: “Now that community identities built on a 
common cultural, linguistic and spiritual heritage 
and the role of national and European identity 
apparently and recognizably increases in the network 
of connection between the great civilizations of the 
world, wouldn’t it be time to recognize the 
community rights of autochthonous national 
minorities and some forms of their autonomy?”3 
 
At this point, the litigation in front of the CJEU 
regarding the so-called Minority SafePack stirs some 
waves on the level of the European Union, in the 
context of the mildly successful direct democratic 
channel of ECI (European Citizens’ Initiative) calling 
                                                 
3 See: MARTONYI, János: Nyitás és identitás. Pólay Elemér 
Alapítvány, Szeged, 2018, 22-23.  
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“on the EU to improve the protection of persons 
belonging to national and linguistic minorities and to 
strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the EU 
through the adoption of a series of legal acts.”4 
 
Against this background, the authors of the papers in 
this book concentrate on different perceptions and 
contexts of the above four elements (as constitutive 
of identity) on their own and on their possible 
connections and contexts in the jurisprudence of 
national constitutional courts in Hungary and in some 
of the countries of the Western Balkans region.  
 
In 1902, one of my paternal ancestors, Ignácz Kuncz, 
wrote that “the nation is the active collective subject 
of the state in thought, will and act.”5 This thought 
perfectly describes the efforts in this book. The 
active collective subject that is represented by our 
thoughts as well as our mutual will and acts that have 
                                                 




5 Original in Hungarian: “A nemzet az activ államalany 
gondolatban, akaratban és tettben.” KUNCZ, Ignácz: A 
nemzetállam tankönyve, Stein János M. Kir. 
Könyvkereskedése, Cluj-Napoca, 1902, 4. 
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been poured into the joint research project detailed 
hereunder.  
 
The project itself bears title of this introductory paper 
and focuses on examining those collective subjects 
(i.e. the nation and communities as in autonomies 
and minorities) that have an important bearing on 
how identity, and more importantly, constitutional 
identity is being framed in the judicial practice of 
those national high courts that have the power to 
interpret the constitution. 
 
Obviously, given their nature, the exact mapping of 
these concepts through constitutional jurisprudence 
inherently entails and necessitates an inquiry into 
many non- or extra-legal factors. However, the 
papers in this book do not primarily intend to analyze 
the host of cultural, sociological, ethnic and political 
science viewpoints that arise but focus on 
constitutional interpretation and its role in the 
“ensoulment”6 of the concepts of nation, community, 
minority and identity.  
 
As identity was specified above as the leading motive 
for current legal and political debates on social or 
regional cohesion in Europe, I would like to start out 
                                                 
6 Ensoulment is a religious doctrine referring to the point where 
the human being gains a soul. Here it is used to describe the 
moment the examined concepts are given specific and essential 
normative content through constitutional interpretation.  
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of the importance of this concept for this research 
and for contemporary academic discourse.  
 
States and constitutions choose different paths to 
reflect on their own national, even constitutional 
identities. In this effort, they inadvertently channel 
emotions (and adjacent values and narratives) into 
constitutional design. “Constitutional sentiments are 
particularly effective where they affirm an emerging 
national identity [and successfully offer] values for 
public identification.”7 If we address this issue, we 
instantly think of Jürgen Habermas’ theory on 
constitutional patriotism and how the people need to 
be able to identify with the value-choices of the 
constitution, which leads right back to certain aspects 
of the identity debate on “constitutional identity”.  
 
In the context of European integration, Leonard 
Besselink put forward already in 2010, that the 
infamous Article 4(2) of the TEU (the “identity-
clause”) creates interesting approaches to national 
(constitutional) identity in multinational (multi-
ethnic) states because of the wording of the Article, 
as it specifies an obligation on the part of the EU to 
“respect the national identities of the Member 
                                                 
7 See: SAJÓ, András: „Emotions” in constitutional design, ICoN, 
vol. 8, No. 3. 2010, 354-385 
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States”. He framed it as a cultural aspect of national 
identity.8  
 
Cutting the inquiry back to the current context, we 
should not forget that states hosting large diasporas 
as minority populace need to actively provide them – 
for lack of a better expression – with “an access to 
identity”,9 i.e. the means to exercise their rights as 
minorities.  
 
The existence of such channels might eventually 
become a key element in a strategic partnership 
(especially within regions that are burdened with 
historical conflict and – from time to time – 
flammable neighborhood dynamics, such as the one 
affected by the research presented in the following 
chapters.)  
 
                                                 
8 BESSELINK, Leonard F.M.: National and constitutional identity 
before and after Lisbon. Utrecht Law Review, 3/2010, 36-39, 
esp. 43-44. 
9 The Constitution of Slovenia e.g. sets forth that the state „shall 
protect and guarantee the rights of the autochthonous Italian 
and Hungarian national communities.” In parallel, the Spanish 
Constitution, sets forth (in its preamble) to “protect all 
Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, 
of their cultures and traditions, and of their languages and 
institutions.” For more on this issue see: SULYOK, Márton: 
Priorities for Kin-State Policies within Constitutions. Minority 
Studies, Special Issue (Trends and Directions of Kin-State 
Policies in Europe and Across the Globe) 16/2013, 231-237.  
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As a matter of fact, national self-definition – besides 
being the embodiment of the integrative function of 
constitutions (and preambles therein) – is a 
fundamental political decision. A choice reflected in 
proclaiming constitutional identity, and whether 
communities and minorities are considered emphatic 
elements therein – reflecting on public sentiment. 
However, “constitutionalizing the dictates of public 
sentiment helps to […] extend the cultural 
environment that, in turn, provides for interpretive 
schemes for these sentiments.”10  
 
Since we have invoked interpretive schemes, we 
should address the role of constitutional courts in 
looking at the constitutional text and defining 
elements of identity, be it national, collective, 
minority or constitutional.  
 
There are many opportunities for these courts to do 
so, as the identity debate intensifies and they grasp at 
more and more target areas within the constitution to 
support their findings. One such area is that of 
preambles, from which the level of responsibility of 
the constitutional legislator toward elements of 
identity can be deduced. These provisions are 
interpretive tools (providing context and narrative) 
for the normative constitutional text as well and may 
                                                 
10 SAJÓ: op. cit, 363. 
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set the tone of how these courts interpret the afore-
mentioned emotions in constitutional design.  
 
Should any sense of legal responsibility follow from 
the preambular text, courts may look at the 
constitution in terms of (i) whether it classifies 
certain minorities as constituent parts of the state (or 
maybe even provides them with parliamentary 
representation), or (ii) whether certain rights exist for 
those communities that identify as minorities 
(together with the contexts of their exercise), etc. 
 
Sometimes, minorities and autonomies might even be 
enumerated as integral parts of a nation’s self-
proclaimed constitutional identity as interpreted by 
the constitutional court. This was what happened 
most recently in 2016, in the so-called ‘identity-
decision’ of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
(HCC). In HCC Dec. 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB, 
regarding the division of competences between the 
EU and Hungary, the Court argued that Hungarian 
constitutional identity is a fundamental value 
acknowledged by the constitution. The decision also 
held that the elements of constitutional identity listed 
were “identical with the constitutional values 
generally accepted today”.11 (i) The respect of 
autonomies under public law, (ii) equality of rights, 
                                                 




and (iii) the protection of the nationalities living with 
us were mentioned, and I only refer to these as they 
will have bearing on several aspects of the research 
laid out in the different papers of this book.  
 
The ‘identity-decision’ of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court evidences our presupposition 
that our four notions (nation, community, minority, 
identity) are interrelated, and we have defined the 
goals of our research in addressing these connections, 
as well as the individual notions.  
 
Based on the above examples and introductory 
thoughts, in the following I shall outline the frames 
of the research undertook, through shortly presenting 
the main lines and directions of each of the chapters.  
 
 
2. National and constitutional identity – 
Protecting achievements of the legal order? 
 
The so-called identity debate, which examines the 
theoretical, jurisprudential and practical trends 
related to the issue of constitutional identity 
represents a quite popular current strand of academic 
literature in constitutional law and constitutional 
theory. Based on what has been concluded above 
regarding the Hungarian ‘identity-decision’, holistic 
identity research can in principle be tied to the 
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research of the rights of nationalities and minorities, 
representing one of the pillars of our research. 
 
However, in the framework of problem 
determination it shall be examined and described 
what guiding principles in the theoretical and 
practical aspects of the constitutional identity debate 
define European and EU legal discourse. The reason 
for this is that these will orient the examination of the 
role and placement of minorities and minority rights, 
e.g. based on samples drawn from tests and doctrines 
developed in the practice of the HCC. 
 
Regardless, at the origins of the identity-debate lies 
the long-standing discussion within the framework of 
European integration regarding the conflict of EU 
law and the constitutional rules of the Member 
States. The Member States and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union naturally have different 
approaches to this topic, leading to different 
emphases in the interpretation of the notion of 
constitutional identity.  
 
Independent of this clash of points of view, the 
concept of constitutional identity is in and of itself a 
divisive phenomenon, given the difficulties of 
conceptual demarcation and the different 
interpretations of the different states and regions. 
This is especially true in those regions where for 
historical reasons identity was lost in transition from 
political regime to political regime, and where it gets 
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lost in translation,12 communicating current priorities 
towards the international community or international 
organizations accompanied by heightened 
international scrutiny in the current state of 
globalization.  
 
At a minimum, though, there is consensus among the 
legal scholarship of European states that the concept 
of constitutional identity should be interpreted by 
those high courts that have the power and 
competence to interpret the constitution. In the 
context of European Union countries, some standout 
opinions exist, however, which consider judicial 
applications and interpretations of constitutional 
identity as ‘nuclear weapons’, foreseeing a ‘judicial 
cold war’ and violent reactions from both sides in all 
contexts where Member States “wish to protect the 
                                                 
12 From a historical-political aspect, in the context of 
Macedonian constitutional identity, member of the Venice 
Commission, KARAKAMISHEVA-JOVANOVSKA Tanja writes in 
her paper titled “Macedonian constitutional identity: Lost in 
translation or lost in transition” that constitutional identity is the 
„institutionalized and collective political identity of [a] country 
that all citizens identify or bond with within the national 




national legal order from European constitutional 
spillovers”.13  
 
As the Hungarian Constitutional Court has stated in 
its deservingly famous ‘identity decision’, 
constitutional identity “is not a universal legal value, 
it is a feature of specific States and of their 
communities, of the nation, that does not apply (the 
same way) to other nations.” Thus, according to the 
HCC, constitutional identity derives, on the one 
hand, from the historical events; and, on the other 
hand, from the peculiarities defining the nation (in 
the case of Hungary, the achievements of the 
historical constitution). As such, the Court considers 
the protection of nationalities a historical feature of 
Hungary and an achievement of the historical 
constitution. In addition, in the catalog of 
(constitutional) values established in the identity 
decision, the HCC defines the protection of 
nationalities as one of the constituent elements of 
constitutional identity. 
 
There are many difficulties in applying the concept 
of constitutional identity, which can mostly be traced 
                                                 
13 e.g. FARAGUNA, Pietro: Taking Constitutional Identities 
Away from the Courts. Brooklyn Journal of International Law. 





back to the multifaceted nature of the concept: the 
difficulty of delimiting constitutional and national 
identity, and the difficulty of identifying the values to 
be protected and the related legal consequences. 
When we talk about constitutional identity, we shall 
ask ourselves who or what is the identity-bearing 
entity, what is the community whose identity we 
want to protect? Who form this community and how 
can we identify and determine the identity of the 
community to be protected? 
 
In the papers dealing with the meaning and 
implications of constitutional identity, the authors 
Norbert Tribl and Zsuzsa Szakály will lay out some 
relevant results of their 2018 survey research 
mapping national constitutional court case law across 
the EU.14 In this survey, national responses have 
                                                 
14 In more detail, see: SZAKÁLY, Zsuzsa – TRIBL, Norbert: 
Örökkévaló identitás? Lehetséges kapcsolat az alkotmányos 
identitás és az örökkévalósági klauzulák között. In Pro Futuro, 
2018/4, pp. 9-25. The questions of the survey read as follows 
and are cited here for context:  
(1) Addressing “constitutional identity”, our research has 
revealed that the very notion remained far undefined across the 
integration. Consequently, our aim is to map out what the 
Member States understand under this concept. We approach 
“constitutional identity” as the “self-definition” of the 
constitutional systems of the respective Member States; as the 
ensemble of fundamental constitutional provisions and 
institutions with historical origins that define the constitutional 
system. We consider these to be untouchable by EU law. 
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been collected and analyzed within the following 
subject matter:  
 
(i) The connection of constitutional identity 
and eternity clauses: Whether the states 
examined apply eternity clauses or similar 
constitutional provisions, and whether 
national constitutional court case law 
refers to constitutional identity providing 
room for the inference that eternity 
clauses are somehow understood as 
manifestations of constitutional identity. 
(ii) The importance of references to 
constitutional identity (and its relevant 
interpretation) in cases where a collision 
between the constitution and EU law has 
been identified.  
 
In his article, Norbert Tribl, will also present samples 
from the constitutional case law of many EU 
Member States, reaching beyond the above-specified 
territorial scope. The reason for this is that not all 
                                                                                       
 (2) As the inherent attribute of the constitutional system, 
constitutional identity embodies “constitutional uniqueness”, 
which is reflected through the national constitutions and acts of 
constitutional magnitude (e.g. organic laws in France).   
 (3) In our point of view the concept of national identity under 
Article 4 (2) TEU shall be matched up with the notion of 
constitutional identity. Throughout our research, we apply the 
definition of national identity as “the Lisbon-concept” of 
constitutional identity under Article 4 (2) TEU. 
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constitutional courts from the research area have 
given answers to the questionnaire, and the ones that 
did outside of the territorial scope of this research 
provide fertile ground for comparative examination 
when considering possible paths of interpretation 
concerning the case law of the courts pertinent to the 
geographic scope of our research.  
 
Responses from the Croatian constitutional court cite 
that fundamental constitutional principles and values, 
the structure of the state, the idea of the social state, 
the protection of national minorities and democratic 
exercise of power are considered priorities, while 
their Slovakian counterparts make reference to some 
decisions dating back as far as 2005, placing the 
person of the president of the republic representing 
statehood and sovereignty, the republican form of 
government, rule of law, democratic exercise of 
power, and protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms within the realm of constitutional 
identity.15  
 
It is interesting to observe that the protections of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the rule of law, 
democratic exercise of power and the form of 
government are key components of some well-known 
eternity clauses as well. This begs the question 
whether constitutional identity is like the ‘emperor’s 
                                                 
15 Consider Constitutional Court decisions no. II. ÚS 171/2005, 
III. ÚS 427/2012 és PL ÚS 7/2017 
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new clothes’ or it does actually add protections to 
what has previously been known as eternity clauses. 
Some argue that they cannot be completely equated, 
but there is certainly a mutual effect they have on 
each other.16  
This is the issue that is at the center of the paper 
written by Zsuzsa Szakály, who examines the 
possible roles of eternity clauses in the context of 
constitutional identity in EU Member State 
constitutions.  
 
Her paper looks at the practice of the Constitutional 
Courts of the Member States regarding eternity 
clause, where it has bearing on limiting constitutional 
amendment. Based on many examples from the 
EU28, from among the countries included in our 
research area, e.g. the constitution of Romania 
includes what is called an explicit eternity clause, 
while Slovakia and Croatia possess implicit (or 
implied) eternity clauses that have been unveiled by 
respective the constitutional courts.17 Her analysis 
                                                 
16 Cf. POLZIN, Monika: Constitutional Identity as a Constructed 
Reality and a Restless Soul. German Law Journal 7/2017, esp. 
1607-1610.  
17 For a brief note on the Serbian case see, pondering upon the 
relation of unamendable provisions within the constitution and 
constitutional identity, see: KORHECZ, Tamás: Az 
alkotmánymódosítás eljárásjogi és anyagi jogi korlátai – 
különös tekintettel Szerbia hatályos alkotmányára. In: 
Közösség, Kutatás, Kihívás, Vajdasági Magyar Tudóstalálkozó 
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also refers to the actual problem of having to 
interpret these issues in the context of EU 
integration. As more and more Member States define 
their constitutional identity, elements of these 
definitions interact not just with each other, but after 
a while also with the content of eternity clauses. 
 
At one point, Szakály reaches an interesting 
conclusion regarding the above-mentioned 
Hungarian ‘identity-decision’, which implicates the 
achievements of the Hungarian historical constitution 
as a basis of reference for constitutional identity. 
This conclusion is that the achievements of the 
historical constitution prescribed under Article R) of 
the Fundamental Law as interpretive tools when the 
courts look at the constitution are in fact implied, 
implicit eternity clauses in as much as they have been 
“found” by the Constitutional Court through 
interpreting the text.  
 
This assertion becomes even more interesting in light 
of the fact that when tautologically describing the 
“constitutional self-identity” of Hungary, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court mentions that the 
respect of public law autonomies and the protection 
of national minorities living in Hungary (along with 
every other enumerated element of identity) are all 
                                                                                       
2018 Konferenciakötet, Vajdasági Magyar Tudományos 
Tanács, Újvidék, 2019. 53-64.  
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such achievements of the historical constitution, 
upon which the legal system rests.18  
 
Whether this is true or not, remains a question to be 
answered by Hungarian constitutional scholarship, 
but here we turn to those aspects of our research, 
which deal with protections for minority rights. 
 
 
3. Minority identity and rights – Protecting 
nationalities as constitutional values? 
 
One of the central social, geostrategic and political 
issues of the Central and Eastern European region is 
that of (national) minorities. This can be traced back 
to the questions raised above: who form the 
community and how the identity of the community to 
be protected can be identified and determined.  
 
The issue became a priority through the aspirations 
of nation- and nation-state building in the 19th 
century, often as a driving force for wars and 
genocide. Nation-building, as a violent solution to 
the ‘minority issue’ was a popular tool throughout 
the 20th century19; however, the international 
                                                 
18 See: Justification [65], HCC Dec. 22/2016 (XII.5.) AB 
19 More recently, we are faced with abhorring examples from 
outside of Europe, e.g. in the case of the Rohingya religious 
minorities in Myanmar, Bangladesh and India, among others, 
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expectation is and continues to be that minorities 
should be dealt with respecting human rights, 
through the constitutional protection of minority 
rights, as well as without redrawing state boundaries. 
 
The framework for managing the issue has already 
been formulated in several international conventions 
and political documents, especially after the end of 
the Cold War, in the Council of Europe, the OSCE, 
but also in the process of the continuous and gradual 
expansion of the European Union.20 Conventions and 
recommendations made within the framework of 
international organizations have gradually been 
incorporated into the constitutions of the countries of 
the region, as well as into their legal system. 
Although certain national features can be discovered 
in this area, minority rights can now be found in the 
constitution of all multiethnic countries in the region. 
 
Several states also recognize collective rights as 
constitutional rights, but individual minority rights, 
such as the right to preserve and express identity; the 
right to the establishment and operation of national 
minority self-government and other organizations, 
                                                                                       
but Hungary and its neighboring countries have seen their fair 
share of violence in this regard as well in the past.  
20 For a most recent summary of these international instruments 
see: SZALAI, Anikó: Nemzeti kisebbségek védelme, in: Lamm, 
Vanda (szerk.): Emberi Jogi Enciklopédia, HVG-Orac, 2018, 
523-530.  
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institutions; the right to education in one’s native 
language; or private and public language use rights 
are generally recognized in the countries of the 
region.  
 
However, minority rights enshrined in constitutional 
documents often lack effective legal protections, and 
through various monitoring procedures it can be 
found that many rights exist only in theory, without 
any actual footing in national policies on minorities. 
For instance, in the field of policies on education and 
language use, the most recent case of the infamous 
Article 7 of the Ukrainian language law can serve as 
an excellent example of how daily politics is able to 
relativize these rights and their effective 
enforceability. Some problems remain regardless the 
protections enshrined in international conventions, 
and even despite some explicit protections in the 
national constitution as well. 
 
When such events unfold, the expectation is that the 
highest courts of utmost importance, notably 
constitutional courts step up and invoke protections 
for these rights. However, in light of all of the above, 
it remains a question whether constitutional courts 
are ready, willing and able to perform this task 
properly? If their competences and powers allow, to 
what extent do they rely on the results and 
approaches of foreign constitutional or international 
courts? What intrinsic or extrinsic factors can 
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influence them? Is their approach influenced by the 
existence of judicial and/or constitutional dialogue or 
by any other “cross-fertilization”21 resulting in the 
betterment of constitutions?  
 
In her paper, Katinka Beretka has examined the case 
law of the Constitutional Court of Croatia from the 
point of view of protecting the rights of national 
minorities since the turn of the millenium. Through 
the identification of general and common patterns in 
relevant jurisprudence, she argued that the Court has 
consistently respected these in adjudicating on 
constitutional complaints and in the review of 
conformity of norms with the constitution in the 
domain of minority rights. This inquiry obviously 
necessitates a brief presentation of the powers and 
competences of the Court before presenting any 
concrete legal approach they might have taken to the 
cases without “politicizing” the debate too much, as 
it has been argued above as well.  
 
Turning to another national constitutional court, this 
time the Hungarian, Noémi Nagy points out that 
from the altogether 10.000 cases decided by the HCC 
since its establishment in 1989, about 1% of the cases 
                                                 
21 cf. e.g. HALMAI, Gábor: Constitutional Transplants. Roger 
Mastermann, Robert Schütze (eds.): The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law. Cambridge, 
University Press, 2019. Halmai uses the expression on p. 580.  
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deal with minority rights issues. Agreeing with her 
that the burden of protecting these rights ultimately 
rests on the shoulder of the Court, we should not 
disregard the fact that the Court is bound to the 
content of the petitions filed to it. Consequently, if 
the subject matter of cases eventually reaching the 
quorum of the HCC is not overloaded with minority 
rights issues, does not exclusively signal that the 
protections afforded for these rights are not a priority 
for them. In this context, Nagy classifies the case law 
of the Constitutional Court along three questions 
addressed: 1. What is a minority? 2. Who belongs to 
a minority? 3. What are minority rights? 
 
While we will find out from Norbert Tribl’s paper 
that the Slovenian Constitutional Court has so far 
remained silent on constitutional identity, their 
extensive case law regarding the protection of 
minority rights provides fruitful grounds for analysis 
for Petar Teofilović. In his paper, the Serbian expert 
will detail how Slovenia guarantees special status 
and special rights to the autochthonous national 
communities (Italians and Hungarians). He argues 
that although these national communities are not the 
only, nor the biggest ones in the country they are 
singled out for reasons of protecting their identity 
and their rights as a form of positive discrimination 
(affirmative action). Regarding constitutional court 
case law, he identifies several cases on the above 
grounds and others having to do with the abstract 
review of conformity of laws with the constitution. 
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On this note, Prof. Tamás Korhecz, a Serbian 
Hungarian expert examines the decades-old and rich 
traditions of the Serbian constitutional and legal 
framework protecting the rights of national 
minorities on both the individual and collective level. 
He offers an in-depth insight into the specific 
provisions of the Serbian constitution protecting 
these rights and examines the role of the 
Constitutional Court in upholding these and in 
creating safeguards and guarantees for their 
protection. Korhecz seeks answer to the question of 
how big of an actual practical weight these 
constitutional guarantees protecting minorities have 
within the Serbian legal system, and how effective is 
the protection and enforcement of these rights in 
front of the Constitutional Court. For this purpose, he 
relies on the interpretative powers of the Court and 
the resulting case law, with specific focus on several 
cases that lead him to conclude that the Serbian 
Constitutional Court proved to be activist in very few 
exceptional cases while exhibiting traditional judicial 
self-restraint in engaging with the issue of extending 
constitutional protections minority rights. 
 
Our Romanian Hungarian expert, prof. Dr. Attila 
Varga analyzes the case law of the Constitutional 
Court of his home country, focusing on a triple 
structure in which minority rights are protected under 
the constitution: (i) as fundamental constitutional 
principles, (ii) as fundamental constitutional rights, 
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and (iii) as elements of the organization of the state. 
As we will see, through various cases, the Romanian 
Constitutional Court has many times interpreted the 
scope of application of the rights of national 
minorities in different contexts in constitutional 
review. While shedding light to interesting trends, 
such as the number of ex ante constitutional review 
of legal norms tripling in one year between 2017 and 
2018, he also summarizes the case law of the 
Constitutional Court following a clear logical pattern, 
from those decisions that have touched upon the 
content of the constitutional revisions affecting 
minorities, moving n to those cases, in which the 
Court as part of reviewing the conformity of laws 
with the constitution, looked at specific questions of 
language use in administrative proceedings or in 
education or regarding the concept of autonomy, to 
mention a few.  
 
In his ambivalent conclusions, Attila Varga arrives at 
the statement that despite a seeming lack of creative 
activism on the part of the Romanian Constitutional 
Court, one should remain positive about the fact that 
the Court’s interpretation of minority rights stay well 
within the exigencies of the constitutional framework 
that Romania created to protect these rights. 
Preserving the constitutional frames of minority 




4. Learning from Each Other: Objective or 
Conclusion? 
 
As part of our research, based on comparable criteria, 
the constitutional court case laws of Serbia, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary are to be 
examined in the field of national and constitutional 
identity, extending to the protection and promotion of 
minority rights from 1990 to this date.  
 
All of the selected countries are European, former 
Socialist countries with varying traditions and roots 
based in rule of law, that have developed with 
regional specificities even after the regime change. 
Constitutional and policy convergence between these 
countries therefore needs to be treated delicately due 
to regional and national characteristics. However, the 
selected countries forming one geographical area, 
being adjacent to each other. Another commonality 
between the countries selected for research is that, 
with the exception of Hungary, the indigenous 
Hungarian minority is the most populous minority in 
these countries or, based on available census data to 
date, is one of the most populous minorities.  
 
Each of the countries selected was, at least in part, 
established in the area of the historic Hungarian 
Kingdom, therefore the Hungarian nation-state idea 
has seriously influenced and shaped legal and 
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political thinking about nation-concept, as well as the 
concept of the ethnic nation-state. This characteristic 
of a unified nation-state is another common 
denominator in the group of countries selected, 
where the existence, role and rights of national 
minorities are acknowledged and recognized on the 
level of the constitution and in sectoral legislation.  
 
Regarding the international framework limiting the 
scope of research, it is noteworthy to point out that 
(the prospect of) membership in the Council of 
Europe and in the European Union has lead each of 
the selected countries to ratify the foundational 
documents of minority protection adopted by the 
Council of Europe. (To this date, Serbia is a 
candidate country of the EU, and negotiations 
regarding minorities are open to this date.22) 
 
                                                 
22 The “Serbia 2019 Report” aptly summarizes the status quo on 
p. 24, by stating: “The legislative and institutional framework 
for upholding human rights is broadly in place. Amendments 
improving the legislative framework related to national 
minorities were adopted in June 2018. However, consistent and 
efficient implementation of legislation and policies needs to be 
ensured. […] Serbia needs to step up measures to protect the 
rights of persons facing discrimination […] and other 
vulnerable individuals; […] ensure a consistent implementation 
of legislation regarding national minorities [...] leading to a 
tangible improvement in the effective exercise of their rights 




The initial objective of the research team, over two 
years, is to present the relevant activity of the 
constitutional courts23 of the region and – through 
evaluating these in a comparative approach – to 
compile a comprehensive body of the most important 
decisions of these courts concerning minority rights 
as well as national and constitutional identity.  
 
The extent to which a given constitutional court has 
protected minority rights so far constitutes the 
baseline of the criteria for the analysis to be prepared. 
Furthermore, it is also examined whether a specific 
constitutional court had in fact already taken to 
interpreting national or constitutional identity and, if 
so, how extensively did they do so.  
 
In this context, it is important to examine the 
question whether there is a consistent frame of 
reference in terms constitutional / national identity 
that has been forged in national constitutional court 
case law, or did it remain on the level of 
proclamations, declarations, third-ranking references 
to support otherwise material argumentation?  
 
                                                 
23 As for the activity of the courts, certain preliminary issues 
also need to be addressed, such as, e.g. the correlation of 
judicial atittudes and personalities and the contents of the 
decisions they promote, the depths of legal training and the 
general interest of legal science regarding the protection of 
minority rights.  
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If the courts apply on constitutional identity, do they 
differentiate between the concepts of national and 
constitutional identity? If so, under what criteria are 
distinctions made? In what areas do constitutional 
courts refer to national and/or constitutional identity 
and what meaning do they ascribe to it? How does 
state (or regional) history influence, if at all, the 
practice of the constitutional courts examined in the 
context of national/constitutional identity? Despite 
any eventual differences are there any similarities 
between the doctrines, values or principles declared 
by these courts?  
 
On this level, points of connection can be 
investigated linking constitutional identity with the 
protection of minority identity and relevant minority 
rights, so the question is whether any reference to 
national minorities and their rights can be found in 
the “identity practice” of the constitutional courts 
examined. If so, a further question is, what is the 
exact function of these links in terms of the actual 
protections afforded for national minorities in 
enforcing protections for their rights.  
 
If minority rights conflict with other constitutional 
rights (e.g. in the form of competing – or concurring 
– fundamental rights positions’ – a test recently 
elaborated in HCC practice), what is the relative 
importance of minority rights in establishing the fair 
balance (schonender Ausgleich) between these 
competing fundamental rights? Can constitutional 
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courts be considered as activist in their approach of 
minority rights in any of the countries examined? If 
there is activism, is it affirmative in terms of minority 
rights or does it go against them? What does 
protecting constitutional values mean in upholding 
protections for fundamental minority rights?24 What 
can the different systems learn from each other – is 
there any ‘cross-fertilization’? 
 
To sum up, we do not need to look too far from what 
has been argued – in the context of comparative 
constitutional law – by Rosalind Dixon and Eric 
Posner writing about the limits of constitutional 
convergence, also specifically addressing the role of 
learning theories.  
 
They conclude that the main “constraint on 
convergence through learning […] is the inherent 
diversity of states, both in their social conditions and 
the goals of their populations.”25 Popular preferences 
                                                 
24 Cf. The part of Article I. para (3) of the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary relevant to this issue sets forth that „[a] 
fundamental right may only be restricted to allow the effective 
use of another fundamental right or to protect a constitutional 
value” (emphasis added). How could similar approaches limit 
or expand the scope of minority rights in concrete cases if, e.g., 
we consider access to (or expression of) identity a constitutional 
value. 
25 DIXON, Rosalind – POSNER, Eric: The Limits of 
Constitutional Convergence. Chicago Jounral of International 
Law. 11/2011, 399-423, citation from 414.  
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aside, however, learning from other states have their 
limitations and caveats, and distinctions need to be 
made between constitutional convergence and policy 
convergence.  
 
As they argue: “States that observe successful 
policies in other states are most likely to want to 
experiment with those policies before entrenching 
them. Otherwise, they may find that foreign practices 
do not translate well domestically, but are 
nonetheless difficult to reverse. In many cases, 
constitutional learning will also point to the dangers 
of particular constitutional choices, in which case, 
domestic decision-makers are even less likely to 
want to entrench legal changes domestically.”26 
 
In this context, despite the obviously very delicate 
regional or even national political, cultural settings in 
which the issues examined are embedded, one thing 
is certain: minority (rights) issues will continue to 
expose domestic (constitutional) courts and policy-
makers to the same or largely similar issues over 
time. Consequently, relevant interpretation will 
continue to place burdens on the shoulders of the 
constitutional courts in the region examined not just 
due to our shared history but also, looking ahead, due 
to the benefits and pitfalls of intra-EU and 
international migration as well. 
                                                 
26 DIXON, Rosalind – POSNER, Eric: op. cit. 413.  
